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SYMPOSIUM 
PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND THE 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: THE ROLE 
OF THE BRADY RULE IN THE 
MODERt~ CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
Lewis R. Katzt 
An argument often made over the last half century against the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is that ordinary citizens lose 
faith in the criminal justice system when guilty defendants go free 
because reliable evidence of guilt is suppressed when police violate a 
defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.1 
That may be the case. However, ordinary citizens and lawyers and 
judges alike should be truly alarmed when they see the criminal 
justice system unable to distinguish between innocent and guilty 
defendants. The credibility of the criminal justice system is 
completely dependant upon its ability to ensure that innocent people 
are not convicted. 
It is too late in the day to believe that innocent defendants are not 
convicted of crimes in America, nor can we avoid the fact that 
innocent defendants have been convicted not just as a result of 
innocent errors. The release of defendants exonerated after years in 
t John C. Hutchins Professor of Law; Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
1 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984) ("Indiscriminate application of the 
exclusionary rule, therefore, may well 'generat[ e] disrespect for the law and the administration 
of justice.'"). 
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prison is evidence of a system that eventually works, but, at the .same 
time, it is also evidence of a system that is subject to terrible error 
resulting in costly human tragedy. It raises ongoing questions about 
those who may languish in prison wrongfully convicted and never 
exonerated. It is fashionable to joke about how all prisoners are 
innocent-just ask them. But tragically, some are. 
The rules governing prosecutors are few and direct. A prosecutor 
may not deliberately misrepresent the truth as in Miller v. Pate, where 
the prosecutor represented a pair of shorts found a mile away from the 
murder scene as blood-stained even though the prosecutor knew the 
stains were paint-not blood. The state used a chemist from the State 
Bureau of Crime Identification who testified that the stains were 
blood, and the prosecutor referenced the blood-stained shorts in his 
final argument. The Supreme Court said that "The Fourteenth 
Amendment cmmot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by 
the knowing use of false evidence."2 Forty years later issues 
concerning the integrity of some crime labs persist. 
The due process clause also requires the prosecutor to correct 
perjured testimony.3 Moreover, the prosecutor's duty does not stop 
with the direct facts of the crime itself, but extends to perjured 
testimony that goes to matters of credibility-such as when the 
witness denies that he has received a promise of leniency or other 
compensation in return for his testimony.4 Yet, almost a half century 
later, cases still arise where witnesses misrepresent what they receive 
in return for their testimony, and prosecutors remain silent or, worse, 
participate in that misrepresentation.5 
These rules are intended to promote the reliability of the 
guilt-determining process by reducing the possibilities for wrongful 
convictions. It is an outrage that violations of these most basic duties 
continue to occur today because they are such basic trip wires 
intended to prevent miscarriages of justice. A prosecutor may not 
knowingly use perjured testimony. 6 Peijury creates the same duty 
whether it goes to an essential fact of the case or to a collateral matter. 
The prosecutor must correct a witness's false statement that he had 
not received a promise of leniency in return for his testimony.7 
Moreover, the prosecuting attorney's ignorance is no excuse. The 
prosecuting attorney trying a case has a duty to find out whether 
2 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). 
3 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). 
4 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 
5 See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
6 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
7 Napue, 360 U.S. 264. 
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promises have been made to her witnesses. 8 Any other rule would 
encourage willful blindness on the part of the attorney trying the case 
Yet anyone who was around the Cuyahoga County Courthouse long 
after the decisions in Napue and Giglio knows that accomplices and 
jailhouse snitches routinely deny that any promises had been made, 
and prosecuting attorneys equally routinely let those denials stand 
without correction. The continued importance of jailhouse snitch 
testimony and incidences of jailhouse snitch petjury indicate that we 
have not come very far in our pursuit of ensuring that juries be made 
aware of the currency of exchange for testimony. 
We certainly have not eradicated the petjury issue, but in 1963, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that the prosecutor's duty to 
see that justice is done involved more than just correcting petjured 
testimony. In Brady v. Maryland, the Court said: 
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution. 9 
Brady is as important for the type of evidence involved as it was for 
the holding. The evidence was not a bombshell that would have 
exonerated the defendant. At Brady's trial, he admitted to 
participation in the felony. His attorney conceded his guilt on the 
felony-murder charge but insisted that Brady's accomplice committed 
the murder. 
Brady's attorney requested to see statements made by the 
accomplice. Several statements were produced but not the one where 
the accomplice admitted shooting the victim. The withheld confession 
also implicated Brady in the murder, indicating that Brady wanted to 
strangle the victim. It was questionable how much the accomplice's 
confession would help Brady in the punishment determination of life 
or death. Not much is clear from Brady except the general principle 
that 1) the prosecutor has a duty to disclose 2) evidence favorable to 
an accused 3) upon a request of a defendant 4) that is material to 
questions of guilt or punishment. The Court did not define 
materiality. Brady seemed to stand for, though unstated in the 
opinion, a broad test of materiality: that the evidence which the 
prosecutor must produce need only be helpful; it need not be clearly 
decisive. A jury exposed to the accomplice's confession admitting 
s Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
9 Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963). 
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that he shot the victim could still return a death sentence against 
Brady. In Giglio v. United States, the Brady duty to disclose was 
extended to impeachment evidence. 10 
Brady seemed to herald a new day and a recognition of a 
prosecutor's higher duty to see justice done even beyond the 
not-insignificant task of correcting peljured testimony. It is the 
prosecutor who knows or should know, despite heavy caseloads and 
insufficient preparation time, where the weak spots and 
inconsistencies are in case files. The prosecutor or the police know 
when witnesses have come forward with information that does not 
match the suspect who became the defendant. It is the prosecutor or 
the prosecutor's investigator who knows of inconsistencies in 
statements made by witnesses who will be called at trial and whose 
memories had to be refreshed in order to overcome those 
inconsistencies. It is the natural competitive nature of the adversary to 
want only the favorable evidence to surface at trial. But it is the 
higher duty of the prosecutor under Brady to ensure that justice is 
done, and that favorable evidence for the defendant is disclosed to the 
defense attorney. That favorable evidence, under these circumstances, 
is the inconsistencies, so that the defense attorney can cross-examine 
the witness about those inconsistent statements. Brady conditioned 
that duty upon a request from the defense so that the prosecutor was 
not obligated to prepare the defense counsel's case. However, the 
condition made the duty non-existent when defense counsel had no 
knowledge of the favorable evidence. The natural response to such a 
rule was for defense attorneys to make broad general requests for "all 
Brady material." 
The Supreme Court's next step was to create a three part test in 
United States v. Agurs, 11 which distinguished between specific 
requests, as the one made in Brady, and general requests. The Court 
began to backtrack on the meaning of materiality. InAgurs, the Court 
divided Brady into three categories: 
( 1) Where a prosecution witness commits peljury, the 
prosecuting attorney has an obligation to come forward with 
information without a request from the defense attorney. 
Where the prosecuting attorney fails to do so, a resulting 
conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury. 
1o Giglio, 405 U.S. 150. 
II 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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(2) Where, as in Brady, there is a specific request for 
favorable information which is ignored, the same test must be 
applied as for perjury: the resulting conviction must be set 
aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the withheld 
evidence would have affected the jury's judgment. The Court 
said there is rarely a reasonable excuse to ignore a specific, 
relevant request. 
(3) Where there is a general request for all Brady material or 
no request at all, the prosecutor has a limited duty to disclose 
obviously exculpatory material. Here the standard for 
materiality and, hence, reversal is whether the undisclosed 
evidence creates a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not 
otherwise exist. That determination is made within the 
context of the entire record. Justices Brennan and Marshall 
dissented arguing that the Court's standard undermined the 
role of the jury allowing the judge to determine whether the 
withheld evidence probably would have resulted in an 
acquitta1. 12 
525 
The years since Brady and Agurs have not strengthened the 
prosecutor's duty to disclose and see that justice is done. Since Agurs, 
the Court has substantially watered down the prosecutors duty, or at 
least diminished the consequences for failing to turn over favorable 
evidence to the defense. The Court eliminated the tougher test for 
materiality when a prosecutor fails to comply with specific request. 
In United States v. Bagley, 13 the government ignored a specific 
request and withheld information that two principal prosecution 
witnesses had contracts with the A TF for money for information. 
Instead the government purposely mislead the defense counsel by 
producing false affidavits from the witnesses that they had no 
promises of rewards. Rather than recognize the egregiousness of the 
prosecutor's behavior, the Supreme Court diminished the standard for 
evaluating such behavior. The Court eliminated the distinction 
between specific and general requests and applied the lesser standard 
to both: a conviction will be reversed "only if there is a reasonable 
probability that had the evidence been disclosed the result would have 
been different."14 
Although the United States Supreme Court has said that when in 
doubt a prosecutor should disclose, the rules do not encourage 
12 Jd. 
13 473 U.S. 667 (1 975). 
14 Jd. at 682 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
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disclosure and are not helpful. Rather than encouraging pretrial 
disclosure of favorable evidence material to questions of guilt or 
punishment, these rules encourage prosecutors not to disclose. The 
result is not pretrial disclosure, but years of post-conviction 
proceedings in an attempt to discover evidence that should have been 
disclosed. Convictions are overturned only where the failures to 
disclose were truly egregious. 15 My friends and former students who 
are or who have been prosecuting attorneys always tell me that I do 
not understand when we discuss this subject. They tell me that their 
caseload is overwhelming and they do not have time to prepare their 
own cases, let alone prepare the defense attorneys' cases for them. 
They also assure me that they ·are not in the business of convicting 
innocent defendants. While that last assurance is admirable, they miss 
the point. They are deciding who is innocent and who is guilty. They 
make mistakes, and they are crippling the adversary system. Ohio is 
like every other state. Defendants have been convicted where 
evidence was withheld at trial. 
One such case is State v. Larkins, 16 where the defendant was 
convicted of a 1981 robbery and murder in 1986. For years he tried 
unsuccessfully to gain access to police reports in his case. Bishop 
Alfred Nickles of Cincinnati filed a public records request with the 
Cleveland Police Department in 1999 and, without objection from the 
prosecutor, received the reports. The police reports revealed that: 1) 
the description of the robbers given by eyewitnesses did not match 
Larkins; 2) a description of"Road Dog," the second shooter, given by 
a potential suspect, Todd Hicks, did not match Larkins as to height, 
complexion or hair style; 3) the police relied on a confidential 
informant; 4) a witness, Sonja Belcher, who was present when the 
robbery was planned, did not identify Larkins as one of the planners, 
and said she saw both robbers after it was known Larkins left town; 5) 
Henderson, a co-defendant who turned state's witness, named Larkins 
only after the police told her that Larkins was known by the 
nickname, "Road Dog;" and 6) Henderson lied on the stand 
concerning her past criminal conviCtions. Moreover, it was also 
discovered that Henderson lied when asked whether the State had 
promised her anyihing in exchange for her testimony. Although 
Henderson claimed she was testifying without any promises from the 
State, the Assistant Prosecutor wrote a letter on her behalf to the 
parole board, indicating that he promised her that he "would do 
everything possible to help her get off parole" because she was 
Jl Cf Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
16 2006 WL 60778 (Ohio App. 8th 2006). 
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initially reluctant to return to Ohio to testify at trial. The Court of 
Common Please granted a new trial which was affirmed by the Court 
of Appeals. When the case was remanded for a new trial, the state 
continued to argue for four years that the police records were 
non-discoverable and could not be used at the new trial. During that 
four-year delay, two witnesses died and others disappeared. 
Ultimately, the trial judge dismissed the indictment as the appropriate 
remedy rather than order a retrial of the defendant. The Court of 
Appeals upheld the dismissal order. 17 
Even DNA testing that excludes a defendant from the crime that he 
has been convicted of has not always resulted in the prosecution's 
admitting error in Ohio. Fred Luckett was convicted as a serial rapist 
in 1979. At trial and for more than twenty years thereafter, Luckett 
maintained his innocence. A rape kit was done on the first victim, and 
a laboratory slide from the kit was found in the hospital twenty years 
later, with the first victim's name etched on the slide, just before it 
was to be destroyed. The slide was made from a vaginal swab 
smeared on to its glass surface just 90 minutes after the first rape. A 
leading DNA laboratory in Maryland determined that the semen 
preserved on the slide was not Luckett's. The victim of this rape, a 52 
year old widow, identified Luckett as the rapist. Rape kits were not 
done on the second and third victims. All three victims identified 
Luckett as the rapist. He was convicted at trial and pleaded no contest 
to the third rape on the promise of no additional time. 
A motion for a new trial was filed based upon the DNA test. At the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial, the state claimed that the DNA 
test was inconclusive because there was no reason to believe that the 
rapist had ejaculated or that the victim had not engaged in consensual 
17 !d. at 9-10 ("Finally, we agree that Larkins has suffered prejudice from the state's 
discovery violation, and that this is the extraordinary case where the prejudice cannot be cured 
by a new trial. Ahnost 20 years have elapsed since the 1986 trial. The court noted that eight 
witnesses for the defense were deceased, six witnesses for the defense had unknown addresses, 
and 1 0 witnesses for the state were without addresses. Larkins' inability to present these 
witnesses speaks for itself, wholly apart from issues relating to the typical degradation of 
memories occurring over long periods of time. Ordinarily, those witnesses who previously 
testified but are now unavailable could have their prior testimony presented under Evid.R. 
804(B)(l). But to do so in a retrial of this case would be useless as none of the witnesses who 
gave the prior testimony could be questioned about the exculpatory evidence withheld in the 
case. ln short, to conduct a new trial at this stage would be meaningless as Larkins' ability to 
use the exculpatory evidence would be negligible, at best, thus making the retrial itself futile. 
We therefore fmd that the court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the indictment as a 
sanction for the state's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence under Crim. R. 16(B)(l)(f). In 
arriving at this conclusion, nothing we have said here should be construed as a comment on the 
outcome of the first trial. The dismissal of an indictment as a sanction for a discovery violation 
is not the same thing as the reversal of a conviction for want of sufficient evidence."); see also 
THE OHIO ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, BROKEN DUTY: A HISTORICAL GUIDE To 
THE F AlLURE TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE BY OHIO PROSECUTORS 1 (2005). 
528 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [VoL 57:3 
sex with another person. However, at the original trial, prosecutors 
introduced the slide to show that the victim was raped. That victim 
died since the first trial and was unavailable to testify. The victim's 
son testified that after she was widowed, his mother had no social life 
and was very unlikely to have engaged in consensual sex. The judge 
who presided at the first trial granted the motion for the new trial, and 
the state appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the order granting a 
new trial, and Luckett remained in prison until he was paroled. 18 
What should be the penalty for a prosecutor's purposeful failure to 
disclose favorable evidence to the trial court and to the defendant? 
Disciplinary action was taken against an assistant prosecutor who was 
prosecuting a child rape and molestation case. At a pretrial hearing, 
IB State v. Luckett, 761 N.E.2d 105, 112 (Ohio App. 8th 2001) ("There is simply no 
evidence in the record either that the individual who raped Martin ejaculated during the 
commission of the offense and/or that Martin was not otherwise sexually active at the time of 
the rape. Although appellee was asked to address these issues both by the trial court in its order 
granting an evidentiary hearing on the motion for a new trial, and by this court during oral 
argument, nothing more than speculation has been offered. We cannot presume that a rape 
victim is not sexually active at the time of the offense merely because she was fifty-one or 
fifty-two years old at the time she was victimized. Without answers to these questions the DNA 
evidence offered by the appellee is of little probative value and is insufficient to establish a 
strong probability of a different result in the eventuality of a new trial."); but see id. at 117-118 
(Cooney, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding the fact that the record as a whole supports the trial 
court's decision to grant a new trial, the majority argues that the trial court should have required 
appellee to present evidence as to the source of the sperm that was found on the first victim and 
on her clothing hours after the attack, and should have detennined whether the victim had 
consensual intercourse within forty-eight hours of the rape. It is uncontradicted that at the 
hearing on the motion for leave to file the motion for new trial, the trial court stated that the 
parties would be required to produce the evidence described above. 
Essentially, the majority is placing the burden solely on the appellee to produce evidence 
outside his counsel's capability. It is important to note that the first victim is no longer alive; 
therefore, there is no way for the appellee to obtain information about any consensual sexual 
partners she may have had at the time of the attack. Furthermore, it was not the appellee's 
burden at trial, nor is it now his burden, to prove his innocence. Instead, as with all criminal 
trials, it was the prosecutor's burden to prove appellee's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Two 
theories of the source of the sperm have been set forth. First, as argued by the state at trial, the 
sperm belonged to the rapist. The majority argues that although DNA testing was unavailable, 
that the appellee should have used the secretion blood-type test to "potentially rule himself out 
as a suspect." The majority also implies that the appellee did not do so for strategic reasons. 
However, it was not the burden of the appellee to prove his innocence at trial; it was the state's 
burden to prove his guilt. Thus, if this test existed, the state could have used the secretion 
blood-type test which would have helped in determining the source of the sperm. However, the 
state also made a strategic choice not to test the sperm that was found on the rape victim within 
two hours of her attack. The second theory presented by the majority is that the sperm in 
question did not belong to the rapist at all but that its source was a possible consensual partner 
of the ftrst victim As noted by the majority, the purpose of a rape kit is to gather physical 
evidence. R.C. 2907.29. The sperm sample in question came from the prosecutor's evidence. 
Thus, as part of its investigation it was the role of the medical personnel or law enforcement 
officers to question the victim as to her other sexual partners as a means of identifying the 
source of the sperm. If the state had asked such routine questions of the victim, the prosecution 
would have been able to make a strong argument as to the source of the sperm. By contrast, it 
was not the appellee's role at trial to interrogate the victim as to her sexual habits."). 
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the assistant prosecutor falsely represented that DNA test results of 
semen on the victim's shirt had not come back when, in fact, he had 
been told that the test results indicated that the semen on the shirt was 
not the defendant's but the complainant-boy's. The assistant 
prosecutor also failed to inform the defense attorney during the plea 
negotiation and a plea hearing and sentencing that the boy had 
changed his story and acknowledged that the semen on the shirt was 
his own. The assistant prosecutor was suspended from the practice of 
law for a period of six months. The defendant ended up entering the 
same plea and receiving the same sentence. 19 
The issues that will be discussed in the following pages go to the 
very integrity of the criminal justice system. The prosecuting attorney 
has the key role in seeing that justice is done. The authors and 
panelists you will be reading are on the cutting edge of these issues. I 
want to thank them for their participation in this symposium. 
19 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 99 Ohio St. 3d 222 (2003) ("[T]he respondent 
knew that the DNA testing had been completed and that it was not [the defendant's] semen on 
the victim's shirt. The fact that the information was not yet provided in the form of a written 
report does not negate respondent's duty to disclose the information. In addition, the respondent 
knew that the victim had changed his story about the source of that semen and neglected to 
inform [the defendant's] counsel. Whether or not the DNA test results were implicated in the 
plea actually negotiated, the credibility of the victim certainly was an issue. Respondent's 
failure to disclose the information before the first plea was inexcusable and undermined the 
integiity of the ciiminal justice system. The failure to disclose this information violated four 
Disciplinary Rules and warrants the imposition of sanctions."). 
